Gradient descent is an important class of iterative algorithms for minimizing convex functions. Classically, gradient descent has been a sequential and synchronous process. Distributed and asynchronous variants of gradient descent have been studied since the 1980s, and they have been experiencing a resurgence due to demand from large-scale machine learning problems running on multi-core processors.
• We show that our AGD algorithm can be applied to two classes of problems which have huge problem sizes in applications and consequently can benefit substantially from parallelism. The first class of problems is to solve linear systems Ap = b, where the A are symmetric and positive definite matrices. The second class of problems is to minimize convex functions of the form • We show that a version of asynchronous tatonnement, a simple distributed price update dynamic, converges toward the market equilibrium in Fisher markets with buyers having complementary-CES or Leontief utility functions.
Introduction
Gradient descent, an important class of iterative algorithms for minimizing convex functions, is a key subroutine in many computational problems. Broadly speaking, gradient descent proceeds by iteratively moving in the direction of the negative gradient of the convex function. Classically, gradient descent is a sequential and synchronous process. Distributed and asynchronous variants have also been studied, starting with the work of Tsitsiklis et al. [17] in the 1980s; more recent results include [2, 3] . Distributed and asynchronous gradient descent has been experiencing a resurgence of attention, particularly in computational learning theory [12, 15] , due to recent advances in multi-core parallel processing technology and a strong demand for speeding-up large-scale gradient descent problems via parallelism. Gradient descent proceeds by repeatedly updating the coordinates of the argument to the convex function. A few key common issues arise in any distributed and asynchronous iterative implementation and their improper handling may lead to performance-destroying overhead costs.
• In some implementations (e.g. [15] ), different cores 1 may update the same component. Without proper coordination, the progress made by one core can be overwritten, and if such overwriting persists, in the worst case the system can fail to reach the desired result.
This difficulty can be avoided by block component descent -each coordinate is updated by exactly one core. This is the approach we use in our Asynchronous Gradient Descent (AGD) algorithm. The approach has been used previously in a round-robin manner [12] , but our AGD algorithm does not require the updates to proceed in any particular order.
• The cores need to follow a communication protocol in order to communicate/broadcast their updates. Communication is often relatively slow compared to computation, so reducing the need for communication can lead to a significant improvement in system performance. Also, when there is delay in communication, cores may use outdated information for the next update, which is a critical issue for asynchronous systems.
One common approach is to assume that the system has bounded asynchrony, i.e. the delay in communication is bounded by a positive constant. Typically, there is a need to wait for updates from the other cores, and the bounded asynchrony simply bounds the waiting time. We will use the bounded asynchrony assumption, but our AGD algorithm will have no waiting: updates will always be based on the information at hand; bounded asynchrony just guarantees that it is not too dated.
• Often, the computation of one core needs the results computed by another core, implying the computations of the different cores must be in a correct order to ensure correctness and to reduce core waiting time. Typically this is achieved via a synchronization protocol, which often requires that all cores follow a global clock. However, such protocols can be costly and even impractical in some circumstances.
As we shall see, our AGD algorithm needs essentially no synchronization apart from an initial synchronization to align the starting times of all cores.
Broadly speaking, most prior work follows the asynchrony model proposed in [17] , in which time is discretized. Our AGD algorithm allows each core to proceed at its own pace. This allows for varying loads, for different updates having varied costs, for interruptions, and more generally for variations in the completion times of updates. To support this, in our model, time is continuous. To ensure progress, we require that each component be updated at least once in each time unit, but do not impose an upper bound on the frequency of updates. A more formal description of our model will be given in Section 2.
We consider a robust family of AGD algorithms, and using our timing model, we give a new amortized analysis which shows each algorithm converges to the minimal value of the underlying function. Most prior work made the strong assumption that each update yields a significant improvement. Our analysis, however, allows for bad individual updates (updates that increase the value of the convex function), which seem to be unavoidable in general. In our AGD algorithm, every update leads to errors in subsequent gradient measurements at other cores. A natural question to ask is whether such errors can propagate and be persistent and whether they might, in the worst case, prohibit convergence toward a minimal point. Our amortized analysis shows that this will not happen when the step sizes used in the AGD algorithm are suitably bounded. The following observation forms a key part of the analysis: if there is a bad update to one component, it can only be due to some recent good updates to other components, or to chaining of this effect. We use a carefully designed potential function, which saves a portion of the gains due to good updates, to pay for the bad updates. The amortized analysis will be presented in Section 3.
Typically the step sizes used in AGD are smaller than those used in its synchronous counterpart. Our AGD algorithm determines the step sizes based on the Hessian of the underlying function. In certain circumstances, the step sizes in our AGD can be a constant fraction of those used in its synchronous counterpart, ensuring that the number of rounds of updates performed by the AGD algorithm is within a constant of the analogous upper bound for the synchronous version. Note that AGD avoids the synchronization costs of its synchronous counterpart, which are a practical concern [15] .
Application: Solving Matrix Systems in Parallel We begin by considering two problems in which bad updates are possible in an asynchronous setting. A linear system is the problem of finding p ∈ R n that satisfies Ap = b, where A ∈ R m×n and b ∈ R m are the inputs. As is well-known, if A is a symmetric and positive definite matrix, solving the linear system is equivalent to finding the minimum point of a strongly convex function, so our AGD algorithm can be applied.
Nesterov [14] discusses the following class of optimization problems: minimizing convex functions of the form
Ap −b 2 , where the f i are convex differentiable univariate functions. The size of such problems can be huge in practice, and input/data can be distributed in space and time, so time synchronization is costly and even impractical. One important feature of our AGD algorithm is to allow the use of data that are variously dated. As we will see, this hugely reduces the need for synchronization. More details are given in Section 4.
Application: Asynchronous Tatonnement in Fisher Markets
We show that an asynchronous tatonnement converges toward the market equilibrium in two classes of Fisher mar-kets.
The concept of a market equilibrium was first proposed by Walras [19] . Walras also proposed an algorithmic approach for finding equilibrium prices, namely to adjust prices by tatonnement: upward if there is too much demand and downward if too little. Since then, the study of market equilibria and tatonnement have received much attention in economics, operations research, and most recently in computer science [1, 18, 8, 16] . Underlying many of these works is the issue of what are plausible price adjustment mechanisms and in what types of markets they attain a market equilibrium.
The tatonnements studied in prior work have mostly been continuous, or discrete and synchronous. Observing that real-world market dynamics are highly distributed and hence presumably asynchronous, Cole and Fleischer [10] initiated the study of asynchronous tatonnement with their Ongoing market model, a market model incorporating update dynamics.
Cheung, Cole and Devanur [6] showed that tatonnement is equivalent to gradient descent on a convex function for several classes of Fisher markets, and consequently that a suitable synchronous tatonnement converges toward the market equilibrium in two classes of markets: complementary-CES Fisher markets and Leontief Fisher markets. This equivalence also enables us to apply our amortized analysis to show that the corresponding asynchronous version of tatonnement converges toward the market equilibrium in these two classes of markets. More details are given in Section 5. We note that the tatonnement for Leontief Fisher markets that was analysed in [6] has an unrealistic constraint on the step sizes; our analysis removes that constraint, and works for both synchronous and asynchronous tatonnement.
Asynchronous Gradient Descent Model
We consider the following unconstrained optimization problem: given a convex function φ: R n → R, find its minimal point. In our model, time, denoted by t, is continuous. The gradient descent process starts at t = 0 from an initial point
For simplicity, we assume that there are n cores, and p j is updated by the j-th core.
2 After each update, the updating core broadcasts it; the other cores receive the message, possibly with a delay. Notational Convention When there is an update at time t which updates the value of one or more variables, for each such variable , we let both t− and t denote its value just before the update, and t+ its value right after the update.
We define p t ≡ p t− , the current point at time t, to comprise the most recently updated values for each coordinate. However, any particular core may have out-of-date values for one or more coordinates, but not too much out-of-date, as we specify next.
Let t 1 and t 2 be the times of successive updates to p j . Then, at time t 2 , the j-th core will have values for each of the other coordinates that were current at time t 1 or later. In other words, the time taken to communicate an update is no larger than t 2 − t 1 . Effectively, this is the constraint on how much parallelism is possible. Informally speaking, the information which the core holds is at most one "round" out of date w.r.t. its updates. In fact, it seems likely that we could extend our analysis to allow for any fixed constant number of rounds of datedness, but as this would entail a proportionate reduction in the step sizes, it does not seem useful.
However, there is no requirement that updates occur at a similar rate, although we imagine that this would be the typical case. It may be natural in some settings for coordinates to adjust with different frequencies, e.g. prices of different goods in a broad enough market. Accordingly, we define a rather general update rule, as follows. Each core has the freedom to determine the time at which it updates its coordinate. To proceed, it will be helpful to define the following rectangular subsets of coordinate values. Let τ j be the time at which the last update to p j occurred, and let t be the time of the current update to p j . To update p j , the j-th core computes ∇ j φ(p), wherep is an arbitrary point inP
This flexibility allows different coordinates at the j-th core to be variously dated, under the constraint that they are all no older than time τ j . The general form of an update is
where F j is a function such that F j (p, ∇ j φ(p), t) has the same sign as −∇ j φ(p). The term t − τ j is somewhat unusual. It is needed because we impose no bound on the frequency of updates. Without this multiplier, a core, the k-th core say, could perform many updates in the time interval [τ j , t], potentially making a cumulatively large update to p k , which could lead to an unbounded difference between ∇ j φ(p) and ∇ j φ(p t ). This appears to preclude the usual approaches to a proof of convergence, and even calls convergence into question in general. If, in fact, t − τ j = Θ(1) always, then this term can be omitted.
Note that the sign of F j (p, ∇φ(p), t) can be opposite to that of F j (p t , ∇ j φ(p t ), t); when this occurs, an update will increase the value of φ, i.e. we have a bad update! We do not require any further coordination between the cores. We just require a minimal amount of communication to ensure that the cores know an approximation of the current point so that they can compute a useful gradient.
Amortized Analysis
Let φ : R n → R be a twice-differentiable convex function. Our AGD algorithm solves the problem of finding (or approximating) a minimal point of φ, which we denote by p * . WLOG, we assume that φ * := φ(p * ) = 0. We assume that no two updates occur at the same time. 
whereg j (t) = ∇ j φ(p j,t ), ∆t j = t − τ j , and 1/γ t j is the step size, which will be determined by a rule we specify later. We assume that ∆t j ≤ 1 always, i.e. two consecutive updates to the same coordinate occur at most one time unit apart. We note that Rule (1) is quite general for it allows both additive and multiplicative updates, depending on the choice of the γ t j . As we shall see, our analysis handles applications of both types. 
; and otherwise, for 
A2. (Upper bound on γ t j .) For each j, there exists a finite positive number γ j such that for all t at which an update to p j occurs, γ t j ≤ γ j . We let γ := max j γ j .
A3. (Bound on nearby future Hessian entries.) 
The remaining conditions are present to cope with the lack of synchrony. Conditions A3 and A4 ensure that the "errors' in the gradients we use for the updates are not too large cumulatively. Basically, they will reduce the multiplier in the progress from (1
Recall that the lack of synchrony may result in bad updates. To hide the resulting temporary lack of progress and to show continued long-term progress, we use an amortized analysis which employs the following potential function.
where g j (t ′ ) := ∇ j φ p t ′ and σ j > τ j is the time of the next update to p j ; for each j, the index i runs over all updates, between times τ j and t, to coordinates other than j; c 1 and c 2 are positive constants whose values we will determine later. ξ β i j are the positive numbers in Conditions A3 and A4; note that these variables are indexed by i but not by the update coordinate k i , so for any j, ξ
The integral in the above potential function reflects the ideal progress were there a continuous synchronized updating of the prices, and the additional terms are present to account for the attenuation of progress due to asynchrony.
Our method of analysis is to show that
for a suitable constant β 1 > 0 whenever there is no price update, and that Φ only decreases when there is a price update; this then yields Theorem 1(a). Theorem 1(b) follows from a stronger bound on the derivative, namely that dΦ dt ≤ −β 2 Φ, where β 2 > 0. This general approach for asynchrony analysis was used previously by Cheung et al. [7] for a result in the style of (b), but for a quite different potential function.
It is straightforward to show that when there is no update,
Lemma 2 below bounds the change to φ when there is an update. Lemma 3 states some useful bounds on the maximum change that can occur to the gradient between two updates to the same coordinate. Lemma 4 below bounds the change to Φ when there is an update. 
Lemma 3. Suppose that between times τ j and t, there are updates to the sequence of coor- 
and 
Proof: By Lemma 2 and the fact (t
We bound E 1 , E 2 and E 3 below. We will be applying (4) and (5) with
Note that by Condition A4,
To bound E 2 , first note that for any
(by Eqns. (5) and (4))
Hence
, and then as ∆t j ≤ 1,
Finally, by Condition A3,
Combining the above bounds on E 1 , E 2 , E 3 yields
As ∆p j = −g j (t) γ t j ∆t j and ∆t j ≤ 1, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 1(a):
and c 2 = 1 − c 1 (2 + 8ǫ B ). Then the following hold:
. By (ii), (iii) and Lemma 4, Φ does not increase at any update.
By (iv), (v) and Lemma 5, Φ(p
, by assumption, has diameter at most B.
Note that at any time t, by the convexity of φ, φ(p
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
By (3),
; and otherwise, for
, and for
Proof of Theorem 1(b):
If φ is strongly convex with parameter c, then, by definition,
Computing the minimum point of the quadratic polynomial in (p
. Then
As in Case (a), Φ ≤ X 1 + 2X 2 ; and by (3),
}.
Solving Matrix Systems
For any symmetric and positive definite (SPD) matrix
is a strictly convex function of p, and ∇f A,b (p) = Ap − b. Therefore, finding the minimum point of f A,b (p) is equivalent to solving the linear system Ap = b, and hence one can solve the linear system by performing gradient descent on
This allows a simple rule to determine a constant step size for each coordinate. By taking all the ξ values to be 1, to apply Theorem 1, it suffices to have γ
(combining A3, A4 and the bound 1 α + 2ǫ F + 2ǫ B < 1), and α ≥ 2. These imply it suffices that the step size, 1/γ j , be less than max
Another application is given by the following class of optimization problems (see Nesterov [14] 
Ap −b 2 , where the f i are convex differentiable univariate functions, A ∈ R r×n is an r×n real matrix and b ∈ R r . The Hessian of F at p is A T A+ D, where D is the diagonal matrix with
, and α ≥ 2. These imply it suffices that the step size, 1/γ j , be less than max
Next, we discuss how ∇ j F (p) is computed by the j-th core. Let G(p) = Ap − b and let A j denote the j-th column of the matrix A.
T A k is a constant and hence can be pre-calculated, so the above equation provides a quick way to update ∇ j F (p) once the j-th core receives the message with ∆p k .
Recall that our AGD algorithm allows different coordinate values to be variously dated, under the constraint that they are all no older than the time of the last update. It is natural to aim to have essentially the same frequency of update for each coordinate. Accordingly, at the i-th round of updates, each core can simply ensure it has received the update for the previous round from every other core. The update messages might arrive at different times, but the j-th core needs not wait until it collects all such messages. It can simply compute the changes to ∇ j F (p) incrementally as it receives updates ∆p k to p k . This avoids the need for any explicit synchronization.
Tatonnement in Fisher Markets
A Fisher market comprises a set of n goods and two sets of agents, sellers and buyers. The sellers bring the goods to market and the buyers bring money with which to buy the goods. The trade is driven by a collection of non-negative prices {p j } j=1···n , one price per good. WLOG, we assume that each seller brings one distinct good to the market, and she is the price-setter for this good. By normalization, we may assume that each seller brings one unit of her good to the market.
Each buyer i starts with e i money, and has a utility function u i (x i1 , x i2 , · · · , x in ) expressing her preferences: if she prefers bundle {x
. At any given prices {p j } j=1···n , each buyer i seeks to purchase a maximum utility bundle of goods costing at most e i . The demand for good j, denoted by x j , is the total quantity of the good sought by all buyers. The supply of good j is the quantity of good j its seller brings to the market, which we have assumed to be 1. The excess demand for good j, denoted by z j , is the demand for the good minus its supply, i.e. z j = x j − 1. Prices {p * j } j=1···n are said to form a market equilibrium if, for any good j with p * j > 0, z j = 0, and for any good j with p * j = 0, z j ≤ 0. The following two classes of utility functions are commonly used in market models. The first class is the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function:
where ρ i ≤ 1 and ∀j, a ij ≥ 0. θ i := ρ i /(ρ i − 1) is a parameter which will be used in the analysis. In this paper we focus on the cases ρ i ≤ 0, in which goods are complements and hence the utility function is called a complementary-CES utility function. It is easy to extend our analysis to the cases ρ i ≥ 0, which had been analysed in [10, 11] . The second class is the Leontief utility function:
where S is a non-empty subset of the goods in the market, and ∀j ∈ S, b ij > 0. Cheung, Cole and Devanur [6] showed that tatonnement is equivalent to gradient descent on a convex function φ for Fisher markets with buyers having complementary-CES or Leontief utility functions (defined in the appendix). To be specific, ∇ j φ(p)
wherez j is a value between the minimum and maximum excess demands during the time interval (τ j , t], and λ > 0 is a suitable constant. As the update rule is multiplicative, we assume that the initial prices are positive. Note that γ
. As we will see, it suffices that λ ≤ , asynchronous tatonnement price updates using rule (9) converge toward the market equilibrium in any complementary-CES or Leontief Fisher market.
In a Fisher market with buyers having complementary-CES utility functions, Properties 1 and 2 below are well-known. Property 3 was proved in [6] and implies that Condition A1 holds when α = 6 and γ 1. Let x iℓ (p) denote the buyer i's demand for good ℓ at prices p. Then for k = j,
Given positive prices
We outline the analysis for the complementary-CES case. As λ ≤ , within one unit of time, each price can vary by a factor between (9/10) 2 = 81/100 and (11/10) 2 = 121/100.
5
Hence, within one unit of time, the demand can vary by a factor between 100/121 and 100/81. For each update to p j at time t, we choose ξ
Proof:
100 81
Proof of Theorem 6 for the CES case: By Property 3, Condition A1 is satisfied by setting γ > 0. As discussed in [10] , the seller might know onlyx j but not x j . Asx j ≥ 81 100
x j , it would be more natural to use γ , which yields update rule (9) . [6] proved that prices in tatonnement cannot get arbitrarily close to zero and hence demands cannot increase indefinitely, so γ j , as defined in Condition A2, is finite. [6] also showed that φ is strongly convex. The result follows from Theorem 1(b).
Ongoing Complementary-CES Fisher Markets Cole and Fleischer's Ongoing market model [10] incorporates asynchronous tatonnement and warehouses to form a self-contained dynamic market model. The price update rule is designed to achieve two goals simultaneously: convergence toward the market equilibrium and warehouse "balance". As in [7] , we modify the price update rule (9) to achieve both targets. Analysing its convergence entails the design of a significantly more involved potential function; the details are given in the appendix.
Leontief Fisher Markets It is well-known that Leontief utility functions can be considered as the "limit" of CES utility functions as ρ → −∞. Our analysis for CES Fisher markets can be reused, with no modification needed, to show that in any Leontief Fisher market, Φ(p t , t, τ ) decreases with t. However, as an equilibrium price in a Leontief Fisher market can be zero, it is unavoidable that the chosen step size γ t j may tend to infinity (as γ t j = Ω(1/p j )), violating Condition A2; thus Theorem 1 cannot be applied directly.
On top of the result that Φ(p t , t, τ ) decreases with t, we provide additional arguments to show that tatonnement with update rule (9) still converges toward the market equilibrium in Leontief Fisher markets. The proof is given in the appendix. However, this result does not provide a bound on the rate of convergence, which appears to preclude incorporating warehouses into the analysis.
Further Discussion of Asynchronous Dynamics Computer science has long been concerned with the organization and manipulation of information in the form of well-defined problems with a clear intended outcome. But in the last 15 years, computer science has gained a new dimension, in which outcomes are predicted or described, rather than designed. Examples include bird flocking [4] , influence systems [5] , spread of information memes across the Internet [13] and market economies [10] . Many of these problems fall into the broad category of analysing dynamic systems. Dynamic systems are a staple of the physical sciences; often the dynamics are captured via a neat, deterministic set of rules (e.g. Newton's law of motion, Maxwell's equations for electrodynamics). The modeling of dynamic systems with intelligent agents presents new challenges because agent behavior may not be wholly consistent or systematic. One issue that has received little attention is the timing of agents' actions. Typically, a fixed schedule has been assumed (e.g. synchronous or round robin), perhaps because it was more readily analysed.
This work provides a second demonstration (the first demonstration is in [11, 7] ) and further development of a method for analysing asynchronous dynamics, here for dynamics which are equivalent to gradient descent. This methodology may be of wider interest.
A Missing Proofs in Section 3
Proof of Lemma 2: By Condition A1, φ
Proof of Lemma 3:
We begin by showing
First of all, we define a few useful notations. Letp max andp min , respectively, denote thẽ p-values at which ∇ j φ(p) yieldsg j,max andg j,min . Let p
To prove (10), we first construct a path P that connectsp max andp min , with each edge in P corresponding to a price update between times τ j and t. 
k,max . P s and P e will be constructed in m steps that correspond to the m price updates at times β 1 , β 2 , · · · , β m . By the end of the ℓ-th step, our construction ensures that the end points of P s and P e are in the setP
Hence, by the end of the m-th step, the end points of P s and P e are in the setP
, which is a singleton, so the two end points must be equal. This allows P s and P e to be concatenated at their end points to form the path P . The specifics of the construction are as follows:
Letp
s andp e , respectively, denote the end points of P s and P e , i.e. initially,p s =p max andp e =p min .
For i = 1 · · · m, do:
• Suppose span p
Note that by the end of the last step, the construction ensures that l i , r i ∈ p (a) If p (e) If p There are at most 2m edges in the path P , with at most two edges added in each of the m steps. Note that the length of each edge added in the i-th step is at most |∆p k i |, so by simple calculus, the change to ∇ j (p ′ ) along each such edge is at most H
. This yields (10).
To prove (4) and (5), first note that sinceP
The last inequality holds since i:
The proof of (4):
The proof of (5):
(swap the indices i 1 and i 2 in the second double-summation)
(by Eqn. (11))
Proof of Lemma 5: First, we bound the integral terms in Φ(p t , t, τ ) (see Eqn. (2)). Following the derivations of (7) and (8), withg j replaced by g j , yields
, the double summation in the above inequality is no larger than the double summation in Φ(p t , t, τ ). Thus Φ(p
Next, we bound the sum
. Suppose there are hypothetical updates to all the coordinates at time t, and p j is updated with the most up-to-date gradientg j = g j and step size 1/γ j . By Lemma 2 and Condition A2,
Here 
Proof: This lemma can be proved by slightly modifying the proof of Lemma 4; we will use the notations defined therein. By Lemma 4, Φ does not increase at the updates made in the time interval (τ j , t). By (3),
By (6),
Combining the two inequalities above yields
The result follows on noting that p τ j + j = p t j and by applying the bounds on E 1 and E 3 in the proof of Lemma 4.
Let U = max max j {p 0 j }, 2 i e i be an upper bound on the prices throughout the tatonnement process [6] .
. Proof: For q = 1, 2, · · · , m, let ∆p j,q be the change to p j at the update timed Υ q , and letz j,q be thez-value used for the update, i.e. γ We will use Lemma 8 to give a lower bound on the decrease to Φ between times Υ 0 + and Υ m +. Ifz j,q < 1, then
By Lemma 8,
By the assumption |p
The minimum value of the right hand side is at least δǫ 2 · min 
Step 1. Let Ω be the set of limit points of a tatonnement process. We show that Ω is non-empty and connected.
Since all prices remain bounded by U throughout the tatonnement process, Ω is non-empty.
Suppose Ω is not connected. Let Ω a denote a connected component of Ω, and let
By the definition of limit points, there exists a finite time Υ ǫ ′ such that thereafter the prices in the tatonnement process are always within an ǫ ′ /4-neighborhood of either Ω a or Ω b . This forces an infinite number of updates, each separated by at least one time unit, such that each update makes a change to a price by at least at least ǫ ′ /2. This contradicts Corollary 10.
Step 2. Recall that a market equilibrium is a price vector p * at which for each j, p * j > 0 implies z j (p * ) = 0 and p * j = 0 implies z j (p * ) ≤ 0. We define a pseudo-equilibrium: a price vectorp is a pseudo-equilibrium if for each j,p j > 0 implies z j (p) = 0. Note that every market equilibrium is a pseudo-equilibrium. We show that all limit points in Ω are pseudo-equilibria.
Suppose not. Let p ′ ∈ Ω be a price vector which is not a pseudo-equilibrium, i.e. there exists j such that p ′ j > 0 but z j (p ′ ) = 0. Let ǫ be a positive number such that for any price vectorp in the ǫ-neighborhood of p ′ ,p j ≥ p ′ j /2 and |z j (p)| ≥ |z j (p ′ )/2|. By the definition of limit points, the tatonnement process enters the (ǫ/2)-neighborhood of p ′ infinitely often. By Corollary 10, there exists a finite time such that subsequently, every time the tatonnement process enters the ǫ/2-neighborhood of p ′ , it stays in the ǫ-neighborhood of p ′ for at least one time unit. By Eqn. (3), Φ drops by at least λ(p
2 during each such stay in the ǫ-neighborhood of p ′ . This is a contradiction since Φ is positive throughout and hence cannot drop by at least
Step 3. We show that the excess demands at all limit points in Ω are identical.
For every subset of goods S,
For each buyer, there are two cases:
• if the buyer wants at least one good in S, say good ℓ:
Observe that by the definition of pseudo-equilibrium and Step 2, every price vector in Ω S , excluding the zero prices in the price vector, is a market equilibrium for the sub-Leontiefmarket comprising the goods in S. Codenotti and Varadarajan [9] pointed out that the demands for the goods in S of each buyer are identical at every market equilibrium of the sub-Leontief market, and hence also in the original Leontief market. So the buyer demands the same positive but finite amount of good ℓ at every price vector in Ω S in the original market. Also note that the buyer always demands the goods in the original market in a fixed proportion. This forces the demands for the goods not in S of the buyer are also identical at every price vector in Ω S .
• if the buyer wants no good in S: Then the buyer demands infinite amount of each good that she wants, and demands zero amount of each good that she does not want.
In either case, the buyer's demands for each good at every price vector in Ω S are identical, and hence also the total demand for each good. Then consider a graph G with each vertex corresponding to a subset of goods S such that Ω S is non-empty, and two vertices S 1 , S 2 being adjacent if and only if d (Ω S 1 , Ω S 2 ) = 0. Since excess demands are a continuous function 7 of prices, if S 1 and S 2 are adjacent, then the excess demands for all goods at every price vector in S 1 ∪ S 2 are identical. By Step 1, the graph G is connected, thus the excess demands at all limit points in Ω are identical.
Step 4. We show that every limit point in Ω is indeed a market equilibrium.
Suppose not, i.e. there exists a limit point p ′ in Ω which is a pseudo-equilibrium but not a market equilibrium, i.e. there exists k such that p
Step 3, z k is positive at every limit point in Ω, and hence every p k at every limit point must be zero. By the definition of limit points, for any ǫ > 0, beyond a finite time, the tatonnement process must stay within the ǫ-neighborhood of Ω thereafter. By choosing a sufficiently small ǫ, z k is bounded away from zero in the ǫ-neighborhood of Ω, and hence p k increase indefinitely and eventually p k becomes so large that the tatonnement process must leave the ǫ-neighborhood of Ω, a contradiction.
C Ongoing Complementary-CES Fisher Markets
The tatonnement process which we described in Section 5 is a two-stage process. In the first stage, the buyers repeatedly report their demands to sellers according to the current prices, then the sellers update the prices with the reported demands. The first stage continues until the market reaches a market equilibrium, and then trades occur in the second stage. Clearly, this is not a plausible real-world market dynamic.
In order to have a more realistic setting for a price adjustment algorithm, it would appear that out-of-equilibrium trade must be allowed, so as to generate the demand imbalances that then induce price adjustments. In an attempt to build a more realistic market model, Cole and Fleischer [10] introduced the Ongoing market model. In an ongoing Fisher market, the market repeats over an unbounded number of time intervals called days. Each day, the seller of each good receives one new unit of the good, and each buyer i is given e i amount of money. In that day, each buyer i purchases a utility-maximizing bundle of goods of cost at most e i .
But then there needs to be a way for seller to handle excess supply/demand. To this end, for each good j there is a warehouse of finite capacity χ j which can meet excess demand and store excess supply. When there is surplus (supply exceeds demand), it is stored in the warehouse; when there is excess demand (demand exceeds supply), good is taken from the warehouse to meet the excess demand. The sellers change prices as needed to ensure their warehouses neither overfill nor run out of goods.
Given initial prices p 0 , initial warehouses stocks v 0 , where 0 < v 0 j < χ j for each good j, and ideal warehouse stocks v * , the task is to repeatedly adjust prices so as to converge to a market equilibrium with the warehouse stocks converging to their ideal values; for simplicity, we suppose that v * j = χ j /2 for each good j. v j will denote the difference between the content of the warehouse of good j and v * j ; hence v j ∈ [−χ j /2, χ j /2]. In an ongoing Fisher market, the sellers adjust the prices of their goods. In order to have progress, the sellers are required to update prices at least once per day. However, there is no upper bound on the frequency of price changes. This entails measuring demand on a finer scale than day units. Accordingly, we assume that each buyer spends their money at a uniform rate throughout the day, and hence instantaneous demand and instantaneous excess demand for good j at any time t ∈ R + can be readily defined; we denote them by x t j and z t j respectively. In this section, we analyse ongoing complementary-CES Fisher markets. Recall that for a complementary-CES Fisher market, tatonnement is equivalent to gradient descent on the convex function φ(p) = j p j + iû i (p), whereû i (p) is the optimal utility that buyer i can attain at prices p. We will introduce new potential functions, which incorporate φ as a component, for the ongoing market analysis.
We use the following price update rule, which is a variant of (9), and which ensures convergence to the ideal warehouse stocks as well as to the market equilibrium:
where λ j , κ j are small constants. Note that γ First, we impose the following bounds on λ j and κ j .
B1. λ j ≤ 1/60; B2. κ j /λ j ≤ 1/10 (this, together with Condition B1, yields κ j ≤ 1/600); B3. |κ j v j | ≤ 1/10 always (such κ j exist since the warehouse sizes are bounded).
We will impose more bounds on κ j , but eventually we will show that, given any fixed λ j satisfying Condition B1, for all j, there exist positive κ j that satisfy all these bounds.
We need to be cautious with Condition B3, and also Condtion B4 which we will state later. At this point, it is not clear that v j remains bounded throughout the tatonnement process, so the two conditions might cease to hold no matter how small κ j is set. We show that this never happens in Section C.3.
the set of all f -bounded price vectors.
Our analysis comprises two phases. Phase 1 finishes when prices are guaranteed to be 1.9-bounded thereafter, and then we proceed to Phase 2. We outline the analysis of the two phases in Sections C.1 and C.2, respectively. We defer most proofs to Section C. 4 .
One component of the potential functions we will use is (similar to) Φ as defined in (2), and we will use some results from Sections 3 and 5. We deduce the values of ǫ B , ǫ F that satisfy Conditions A3 and A4. Recall that by Property 3 of complementary-CES markets (see the appendix on tatonnement), if
where 
and
C.1 Phase 1
For Phase 1, we use the potential function Ξ 1 ≡ Ξ 1 (p t , v t , t, τ ):
When there is no update, we show that
When there is an update, we show that 
Thus, by setting c 1 = 5/28 and c 2 = 1/2, Ξ 1 does not increase at any update.
Since φ is strongly convex, in the proof of Theorem 1(b), we show that j
for some positive constant
We impose an additional condition on κ j : B4. κ j are sufficiently small such that j
Lemma 14. If Condition B4 holds and
at time t. By (18) and Condition B4,
With our choices of c 1 , c 2 and Condition B4, (19) yields
Proof: Suppose the contrary, i.e. at some time t 2 > t 1 , Ξ 1 (t 2 ) > ψ/2. Let T 2 be the collection of all such t 2 , and let t ′ be the infimum of T 2 . By Lemma 13 and our choices of c 1 and c 2 , Ξ 1 never increases at an update. Hence, for Ξ 1 to exceed ψ/2 after time t 1 , it must be due to continuous incrementing. This forces Ξ 1 (t ′ ) = ψ/2 and dΞ 1 dt t=t ′ ≥ 0. But these contradict Lemma 14.
Following the proof of Lemma 5, we obtain that Ξ 1 ≥ φ(p t ) − 2c 1 (1 + 8ǫ B )φ(p t ), and as
and thus p t ∈ R(1.9). Lemma 14 shows that Ξ 1 decreases linearly until it drops below ψ/2 at some time t 1 , and Lemma 15 shows that Ξ 1 remains below ψ/2 thereafter. Hence, ∀t ≥ t 1 , p t ∈ R(1.9) and we proceed to the analysis of Phase 2.
C.2 Phase 2
Phase 2 starts when all prices are guaranteed to be 1.9-bounded thereafter. Then each demand is between 1 1.9 and 1.9 and hence −0.5 ≤ z j ,z j ≤ 0.9. Since |κ j v j | ≤ 0.1 always, in Phase 2 the update rule (12) is equivalent to
i.e. γ
In this phase, we will use a new potential function Ξ 2 , which comprises two main components Φ and W. Φ reflects how far the current prices are from the market equilibrium, and W accounts for the warehouse imbalances.
When there is no update, it is straightforward to show that 
When there is no update, we show that for any
We will choose an appropriate value of R 1 at the end. 
We will choose an appropriate value of R 2 at the end.
C.2.3 Ultimate Potential Function Ξ 2
The ultimate potential function
From Lemmas 16 and 17, we deduce that
From (25), (26) and the fact that p j ≥ p * j /1.9, we deduce that
We also show the following upper and lower bounds on Ξ 2 .
Also,
In the next lemma, we show that j p *
, with the hidden constant in O(1) depending on max i θ i , where θ i is the parameter of the CES utility function of buyer i.
where M = 1 −θ −1 max 26.56 , 6.64θ 1 +θ − 2θ
Finally, we choose parameters R 1 , R 2 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 such that Ξ 2 never increases at an update, and if there is no update, then 
This implies that φ(p t ) + j κ j λ j p * j (v j ) 2 decreases linearly, and finishes the proof of Theorem 11, except that we need to show Conditions B3 and B4 hold throughout the tatonnement process.
C.3 Warehouse Stocks Are Bounded
So far we need κ j to satisfy Conditions B2, B3 and B4. Conditions B2 is satisfied so long as κ j is sufficiently small. However, we need to be cautious with Conditions B3 and B4 as it is not immediately evident that v j remains bounded throughout the tatonnement process. We begin with Phase 1. The initial value of Ξ 1 decreases as κ j decreases, and Phase 1 ends when Ξ 1 is smaller than ψ/2, which is independent of κ j . By (22), Ξ 1 drops linearly at a rate that does not depend on κ j . Hence, the length of Phase 1 is finitely bounded when the κ j are sufficiently small. The change to each warehouse j is upper bounded by (The length of Phase 1) × (Maximum excess demand for good j in Phase 1), which is also finitely bounded. This allows us to set κ j sufficiently small to ensure that Conditions B3 and B4 hold throughout Phase 1.
Next, we consider Phase 2, which starts at some time t 2 . At t 2 , which is the finishing time of Phase 1, Conditions B3 and B4 hold. Let B := Ξ 2 (t 2 ). Note that by (32), when Conditions B1-B4 hold, there exist constants C 1 , C 2 such that
We impose two additional conditions on κ j :
B5. κ j are sufficiently small such that for all j, κ j ≤ C 2 p * j λ j 101B . B6. κ j are sufficiently small such that for all j, κ j ≤ Suppose that at some time t 3 > t 2 , Condition B3 or B4 ceases to hold. By our analysis of Phase 2, Ξ 2 decreases between times t 2 and t 3 , so Ξ 2 (t 3 ) ≤ B.
If Condition B3 ceases to hold at t 3 , as the warehouse contents change smoothly, there exists a good ℓ with |κ ℓ v ℓ | = 1/10, and for other goods Condition B3 remains valid. Thus we can still apply (33) with Condition B5 to yield
which is a contradiction. If Condition B4 ceases to hold at t 3 , as the warehouse contents change smoothly, j p j λ j (κ j v j ) 2 = 1 26/D 1 +4 ψ. Thus we can still apply (33) with Condition B6 to yield
which is a contradiction. Thus, there does not exist t 3 > t 2 at which Condition B3 or B4 ceases to hold, i.e. the two conditions hold throughout Phase 1 and Phase 2.
Recall from the proof of Lemma 4 that
. We derive the following bounds:
By direct expansion and regrouping terms, we have
(t − τ j ) ≤ Φ + 1.2W + 0.1212 j κ j p * j (f j ) 2 R 2
. With the two inequalities above, the result follows.
To prove Lemma 18, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 19. For all p ′ ∈ R(1.9), φ(p ′ ) ≥ 1−θ 13.28
Proof: Let x ij (p ′ ) be the demand for good j of buyer i at price p ′ . Note that 
